Обсуждение:‘Усман ибн ‘Аффан

Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān / ʿUthmān

Абу Абдаллах Усман б. Аффан, третий халиф (qv; r. 23-35/644-55) и первый “правильно направленный” ( rāshid) халиф из клана Омейядов, рано принявший ислам и эмигрировавший ( muhājir; см. эмигранты и помощники ) как в Абиссинию (qv), так и в Медину (qv; см. также эмиграцию ). Эти благочестивые учетные данные (см. благочестия ) бесперспективны из-за его отсутствия в битве при Бадре (сахара), его полет в Uḥud (см. экспедициях и боях ), его отсутствие в Ḥudaybiya (см.; см. Бухари, Сахих, 66, Faḍāʾil Аль-Qurʾān, 3; изд. Крель, iii, 93; пер. Гудас, iii, 522-3) и его предполагаемое нечестие в течение последних шести лет его халифального правления (Масуди, Мурудж, iii, 76). Он был зарезан во время чтения Корана (предположительно, из мусафа, ныне известного как Самарканд) повстанцами из Египта. Усману часто приписывают стандартизацию и кодификацию настоящего текста Корана, который поэтому называется Усманским кодексом (см. также сборник Корана; кодексы корана). Историчность повествования о Усманском кодексе по большей части принимается учеными в пользу повествований, приписывающих сборник Абу Бакру или другим ранним халифам (Caetani, hUthmān; Nöldeke, gq, ii, 11-27, 47-62; Jeffery, Materials, 4-9; pace Mingana, Transmission). Этот рассказ повествует о том, что один из генералов Усмана (Худхайфа), встревоженный спорами между его сирийскими и иракскими солдатами по поводу чтения Корана (см. чтение корана; сирия; Ирак) в ходе завоеваний (см. завоевание ), спросил халиф руководство, умоляя: “о повелитель правоверных, сообщите об этом сообществу, что нужно сделать, прежде чем мы разделены в нашей книге (см. партий и фракций; показания qurʾān) как евреев (см. евреи и иудаизм ) и христиане” (Бухари, Сахих, 62, Faḍāʾil aṣḥāb Аль-Наби, 7; авт. Крель, ii, 430-1; пер. Houdas, ii, 601-2; см. также христиане и христианство ). В ответ Усман добыл материалы Корана, уже собранные Абу Бакром, у Хафши (см.; который получил их через преемника Абу Бакра, ее отца Умара; см. также жены пророка ). Имея это в качестве ссылки, а также с комитетом, состоящим из про-курайшитского Мединана Зайда б. Табита (также главного героя повествования о сборнике Абу Бакра) и трех курайшитов (см. курайшит), мман имел музаф, написанный на диалекте курайшитов (см. диалекты; арабский язык). Он отправил копии, чтобы Baṣra, Kūfa, Дамаск и Мекку (сахара; Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, т. II, 160, добавляет Египет, Бахрейн, Йемен и Джазира) и постановил, что все варианты будут уничтожены, заказа, что встретило сопротивление со стороны многих (см. чтецами qurʾān; учение и проповедь Корана) и прямой отказ от сподвижника Ибн Масуда в Куфе (см. Аль-Balādhurī (ФЛ. третий/девятый вв.; Ansāb, в, 36) и Ибн Masʿūd объявить законным халифом кровь в ответ, в то время как Аль-Yaʿqūbī (ум. в начале четвертого/десятого вв.; Taʾrīkh, т. II, 160) рассказывает, что двое подрались в мечеть на Kūfa. Историчность этого повествования, однако, не подлежит сомнению. Ряд факторов — конфликты между различными версиями, избыточность повествования о сборнике Абу Бакра и временная удаленность источников от событий — предполагают, что это скорее продукт спекуляций и апологии, чем исторической диктовки (на самом деле ранние мусульманские ученые спорили о том, как примирить избыточные и противоречивые сообщения; Хаттаби [ум. 386/996] приходит к выводу, что Бог вдохновил [ альхаму] всех “правильно управляемых халифов”, аль - Хулафах аль-рашидун; см. [начало главы 18]). Бертон (Сборник, 202-39) утверждает, что повествование предназначено для того, чтобы скрыть тот факт, что Мухаммад сам составил Коран, тем самым оправдывая отсутствие в мусхафе (то есть Коран в книжной форме; см. устность и письменность в Аравии ) некоторых элементов, которые, как утверждается, находятся в богооткровенном Коране (например, стих о побивании камнями, аят аль-раджм). Бертон также указывает, что альтернативные кодексы продолжали использоваться в юридических спорах после того, как они были якобы уничтожены приказами Усмана, предполагая, что на самом деле они были “задними, а не предшествующими тексту Усмана” (там же, 228; см. Вансбро (qs, 45), между тем, отмечая отсутствие дошедших до нас вариаций к Усманскому кодексу и считая маловероятным, что халиф мог проделать такую полную работу по уничтожению других версий, предполагает, что эта история предназначена для сокрытия позднего происхождения Корана. Недавно отредактированные работы, однако, еще больше усложняет эту гипотезу (см. МФ. Старуха и Циммерман, послание). Таким образом, ученые мнения расходятся в оценке Усмана: одни видят в нем того, кто с благочестивой тщательностью установил textus receptus ne varietur Корана; другие считают его полулегендарной фигурой исламской истории спасения. Это кажется очевидным: многие традиции, связанные с кодификацией Корана, исходят из периода, когда исламское религиозное развитие подпитывалось апологетическими и полемическими проблемами (см. В ТРЕТЬЕМ и четвертом исламских веках распространились тексты о доказательствах ( далахиль) пророчества Мухаммеда (см. пророки и пророчество; чудеса), неподражаемости (qv; иджаз) Корана и опровержении ( радд) других религий (см. терпимость и принуждение; религиозный плюрализм и коран). В этом контексте повествование об Усманском кодексе служит ясной цели: оно подтверждает мусульманам, что их мусаф действительно является Кораном, ниспосланным с небес (см. Книгу; небесная книга; богословие и коран; сотворенность корана). Дальнейшая работа по раннему Qurʾān рукописей (например, найти в Ṣanʿāʾ; см. ) — не исключая исследование в устном народном творчестве (см.) и различные показания qurʾānic текста (см. просвещенное научное исследование qurʾān ) — остается желаемой целью более полного понимания историчности повествований о формировании ʿUthmānic кодекса (см. Также традиционным дисциплинам qurʾānic исследования; стихи; sūras).

Abū ʿAbdallāh ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān, third caliph (q.v.; r. 23-35/644-55) and first ¶ “rightly guided” ( rāshid) caliph from the Umayyad clan, an early convert to Islam and emigrant ( muhājir; see emigrants and helpers ) to both Abyssinia (q.v.) and Medina (q.v.; see also emigration ). These pious credentials (see piety ) are tainted by his absence at the battle of Badr (q.v.), his flight at Uḥud (see expeditions and battles ), his absence at Ḥudaybiya (q.v.; see Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, 66, Faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān, 3; ed. Krehl, iii, 93; trans. Houdas, iii, 522-3) and his alleged impiety during the latter six years of his caliphal rule (Masʿūdī, Murūj, iii, 76). He was stabbed to death while reading from the Qurʾān (supposedly from the muṣḥaf [q.v.] now known as the Samarqand codex) by insurgents from Egypt. ʿUthmān is often credited with standardizing and codifying the present qurʾānic text, which is therefore called the ʿUthmānic codex (see also collection of the qurʾān; codices of the qurʾān). The historicity of the ʿUthmānic codex narrative is, for the most part, accepted by scholars in preference to narratives attributing the collection to Abū Bakr or other early caliphs (Caetani, ʿUthmān; Nöldeke, gq, ii, 11-27, 47-62; Jeffery, Materials, 4-9; pace Mingana, Transmission). This narrative relates that one of ʿUthmān's generals (Ḥudhayfa), alarmed at disputes between his Syrian and Iraqi soldiers over qurʾānic recitation (see recitation of the qurʾān; syria; iraq) during the conquests (see conquest ), asked the caliph for guidance, imploring: “O Commander of the Faithful, inform this community what to do before we are divided in our reading (see parties and factions; readings of the qurʾān) like the Jews (see jews and judaism ) and the Christians” (Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, 62, Faḍāʾil aṣḥāb al-nabī, 7; ed. Krehl, ii, 430-1; trans. Houdas, ii, 601-2; see also christians and christianity ). In response, ʿUthmān secured the Qurʾān materials already gathered by Abū Bakr ¶ from Ḥafṣa (q.v.; who had received them via Abū Bakr's successor, her father ʿUmar; see also wives of the prophet ). With this as reference, and with a committee made up of the pro-Qurayshite Medinan Zayd b. Thābit (also protagonist of the Abū Bakr collection narrative) and three Qurayshites (see quraysh ), ʿUthmān had a muṣḥaf written in the dialect of the Quraysh (see dialects; arabic language). He sent copies of it to Baṣra, Kūfa, Damascus and Mecca (q.v.; Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, ii, 160, adds Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and the Jazīra) and ordered that all variant versions be destroyed, an order that met with resistance from many (see reciters of the qurʾān; teaching and preaching the qurʾān) and outright refusal from the Companion Ibn Masʿūd in Kūfa (see companions of the prophet ). Al-Balādhurī (fl. third/ninth cent.; Ansāb, v, 36) has Ibn Masʿūd declare the caliph's blood licit in response, while al-Yaʿqūbī (d. early fourth/tenth cent.; Taʾrīkh, ii, 160) relates that the two came to blows in the mosque at Kūfa. The historicity of this narrative, however, is not beyond dispute. A number of factors — conflicts between different versions, redundancies with the Abū Bakr collection narrative and the temporal distance of sources from events — suggest that it is more the product of speculation and apology than historical dictation (in fact, early Muslim scholars disputed how to reconcile the redundant and contradictory reports; Khaṭṭābī [d. 386/996] concludes that God inspired [ alhama] all of the “rightly guided caliphs,” al- khulafāʾ al-rāshidūn; see Suyūṭī, Itqān, 202 [beginning of chap. 18]). J. Burton (Collection, 202-39) argues that the narrative is meant to conceal the fact that Muḥammad himself compiled the Qurʾān, thus justifying the absence from the muṣḥaf (that is, the Qurʾān in book form; see orality and writing in arabia ) of certain elements argued to be in the revealed ¶ Qurʾān (e.g. the stoning [q.v.] verse, āyat al-rajm). Burton also points out that alternate codices continued to be used in legal disputes after they were supposedly destroyed by ʿUthmān's orders, suggesting that they were actually “posterior, not prior, to the ʿUthman text” (ibid., 228; see abrogation; law and the qurʾān). J. Wansbrough (qs, 45), meanwhile, noting the absence of extant variations to the ʿUthmānic codex and considering it unlikely that the caliph could have done such a complete job of destroying other versions, suggests that the story is meant to conceal the late origins of the Qurʾān. A recently edited work, however, further complicates this hypothesis (cf. Crone and Zimmermann, Epistle). Thus scholarly opinion differs in its estimation of ʿUthmān: some see him as the one who established, with pious meticulousness, the textus receptus ne varietur of the Qurʾān; others regard him as a semi-legendary figure of Islamic salvation history. This much seems clear: many traditions surrounding ʿUthmān's codification of the Qurʾān come from a period when Islamic religious development was fueled by apologetical and polemical concerns (see apologetics; polemic and polemical language). In the third and fourth Islamic centuries texts on the proofs ( dalāʾil) of Muḥammad's prophecy (see prophets and prophethood; miracles), the inimitability (q.v.; iʿjāz) of the Qurʾān and the refutation ( radd) of other religions proliferated (see tolerance and coercion; religious pluralism and the qurʾān). The ʿUthmānic codex narrative serves a clear purpose in this context: it confirms to Muslims that their muṣḥaf is indeed the Qurʾān sent down from heaven (see book; heavenly book; theology and the qurʾān; createdness of the qurʾān). Further work on early Qurʾān manuscripts (such as the find in Ṣanʿāʾ;¶ see manuscripts of the qurʾān; tools for the study of the qurʾān) — not excluding the study of the orality (q.v.) and variety of readings of the qurʾānic text (see post-enlightenment academic study of the qurʾān ) — remains a desideratum for a fuller understanding of the historicity of the narratives concerning the formation of the ʿUthmānic codex (see also traditional disciplines of qurʾānic study; verses; sūras).

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Primary

Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, ed. ʿAmrawī

al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā, Ansāb al-ashrāf, ed. S. Goitein, 5 vols., Jerusalem 1936

Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, ed. Krehl

trans. O. Houdas and W. Marçais, Les traditions islamiques, Paris 1908

P. Crone and F. Zimmermann (eds.), The epistle of Sālim ibn Dhakwān, Oxford 2001

Suyūṭī, Itqān

Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, ed. M. Ṣādiq, Najaf 1964.

Secondary

Burton, Collection (alternative visions of the development of the qurʾānic text)

L. Caetani, ʿUthmān and the recension of the Koran, in mw 5 (1915), 380-90

M. Hinds, The murder of the caliph ʿUthmān, in ijmes 3 (1972), 450-69

Jeffery, Materials

Ch. Luxenberg, Die Syro-Aramäische Lesart des Koran, Berlin 2000 (alternative visions of the qurʾānic text)

W. Madelung, The succession to Muḥammad, Cambridge 1998, chap. 3

A. Mingana, The transmission of the Koran, in mw 7 (1917), 223-32, 402-14

H. Motzki, The collection of the Qurʾān, in Der Islam 78 (2001), 1-35 (a defense of the historicity of the ʿUthmān narrative)

Nöldeke, gq

A.-L. de Prémare, Les fondations de l'Islam, Paris 2002, 278-316

Wansbrough, qs (alternative visions of the qurʾānic text)

Cite this page

Reynolds, Gabriel Said, “ʿUthmān”, in: Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, General Editor: Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Georgetown University, Washington DC. Consulted online on 07 January 2017 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-3922_q3_EQSIM_00439>

ʿUt̲h̲mān b. ʿAffān // Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition

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ʿUt̲h̲mān b. ʿAffān, the third of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs (23-35/644-55). He belonged to the great Meccan family of the Banū Umayya [q.v.], and more particularly to the branch of Abu ’l-ʿĀṣī who was his grandfather; for his genealogy, see Wüstenfeld, Geneal . Tabellen , U. 23, and the table in umayya. His sudden support for the Prophet’s preaching began his life as a Muslim.

ʿUt̲h̲mān was a very rich merchant and an accomplished man of the world. The tradition which represented him as the very esssence of beauty and elegance to the extent of being overgroomed may very well have been authentic, precisely because it was so strange. Whatever deep motive led him to embrace ¶ a cause with such an obscure origin will always remain a mystery. Part of the historiographical tradition relates the conversion of ʿUt̲h̲mān with his marriage to Ruḳayya [q.v.], the daughter of Muḥammad; but other sources, probably more correctly, place his marriage after his entry into Islam. The conversion of ʿUt̲h̲mān, the first socially high-ranking Muslim, certainly created a stir and contributed to the success of the new religion. However, his personal action in this field was never remarkable. An indolent personality, though one marked by a lively faith and great generosity, is attributed by tradition to ʿUt̲h̲mān. This was unlikely to have been an invention to excuse the inactivity of the caliph with respect to the malpractices of his officials, for the lack of energy and initiative ascribed to ʿUt̲h̲mān had become clear right from the start of his career, and this must have been a real defect of character. He is thought to have taken part in the two emigrations to Abyssinia and was later one of the muhād̲j̲irūn to Medina. Certainly, he does not seem to have taken part in the battle of Badr (he is said to have been looking after his sick wife at the time; nevertheless, the Prophet thought he had been present and therefore assigned him part of the booty).

After the death of Ruḳayya the alliance between ʿUt̲h̲mān and the Prophet was renewed by his marriage to another of the Prophet’s daughters, Umm Kult̲h̲ūm [q.v.]. The doubts that have been raised (see Lammens, Fāṭima et les filles de Mahomet , 3-5) over the authenticity of this marriage are not justified, in particular because the papyrus roll of Ibn Lahīʿa early bore witness to it (see R.G. Khoury, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Lahīʿa , 282, traditions 260-1, and 183, 7-8). Furthermore, there were clear advantages in such a union with a Meccan aristocrat.

In the lifetime of the Prophet and during the caliphates of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, ʿUt̲h̲mān played a most unobtrusive role. Hence the question is raised of how it came about that the council ( shūrā [q.v.]) set up by ʿUmar on his deathbed should have chosen him as the successor to the second caliph. The sources relating to the history of this diligent “conclave” have been analysed minutely by Caetani, but it is only too obvious that the mystery of such a secret debate is destined to elude the critical appraisal of history forever. Candidates who were too outstanding cancelled each other out. One of these was ʿAlī, whose election would have signified the repudiation of the politics of ʿUmar. Such also, it would seem, were Zubayr and Ṭalḥa, who were opponents of ʿUmar and suspected of ambition and greed. Of the three remaining candidates, Saʿd b. Abī Waḳḳāṣ, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf and ʿUt̲h̲mān, one would imagine that the reason the last was chosen, in addition to his marriage connections with the Prophet, would be the fact that he belonged to the clan of the Umayyads, and this would be the most decisive argument in his favour. The Umayyads, even in the lifetime of Muḥammad and especially in the caliphate of ʿUmar, had already partly regained the position they had enjoyed in the Ḏj̲āhiliyya . It is pointless to imagine that Abū Sufyān, the head of the family, had been the deus ex machina of the politics of the first twenty years of the régime of the caliphate, and it would be naive to portray the Umayyads as having formed a sort of “secret committee” with the Islamic state to command at will. In reality, the Umayyads were able to wield their influence more because of the indisputable talent in public affairs which some of their members possessed than because of their noble birth. But from the time of ʿUmar this was counterbalanced ¶ by the part played by the other elements, and in particular by the oldest “Companions of the Prophet”. It was the strong personality of the second caliph which enabled him to maintain equilibrium between a number of heterogeneous factions who were often opposed to each other.

But this was not the case with ʿUt̲h̲mān. In fact as Wellhausen earlier observed, and as Caetani has amply demonstrated, ʿUt̲h̲mān only furthered and developed the politics of ʿUmar. The difficulties which he encountered were merely the consequence of the premises posed by his predecessor, but it was at this point that the differences in their talents became noticeable.

The tragedy which brought a bloody end to the reign of ʿUt̲h̲mān and ushered in the period of civil wars has caused much embarrassment to Arab historiographers. They have been obliged to record the series of grievances brought against ʿUt̲h̲mān’s regime by his opponents, or vice versa, to recognise that the caliph had sinned against the law of his land, or even that his accusers, among whom were some of the most venerated patriarchs of this land, had lied or had been wrong. It was thanks to this distressing dilemma (from which the orthodox tradition extracted itself by the expedient of the “excusable error” and other subtle distinctions) that the long list of grievances has been preserved for us in great detail in the writings of Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī, al-Riyāḍ al-naḍira fī manāḳib al-ʿas̲h̲ara , ii, 137-52; al-Balād̲h̲urī, Ansāb , v, 1-124. This work is of importance as it corrects and completes certain aspects of the information previously known, although it does not add much new material.

The first grievance, and perhaps the most serious, was that he had nominated members of his family for provincial governorships. While Syria had long been in the hands of the Umayyad Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān, at Baṣra and at Kūfa ʿUt̲h̲mān replaced Abū Mūsā al-As̲h̲ʿarī and Saʿd b. Abī Waḳḳāṣ [q.vv.] by his two relatives ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿĀmir b. Kurayz and al-Walīd b. ʿUḳba [q.vv.], his half-brother. When the latter was deposed, after being involved in a scandalous affair, he was replaced by another Umayyad, Saʿīd b. al-ʿĀṣ, to whom is attributed the well-known saying “the sawād of Kūfa is the garden of the Ḳurays̲h̲”. Even Egypt, first conquered by ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ, fell to ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿd b. Abī Sarḥ, who was not an Umayyad and whose past was dubious. Finally, the private counsellor of the caliph, whose disastrous influence was described by tradition, was Marwān b. al-Ḥakam b. Abi ’l-ʿĀṣī, the first cousin of the caliph, who had recalled his father from the exile to which the Prophet had condemned him.

It is impossible to deny a certain nepotism in the measures taken by ʿUt̲h̲mān. However, his deeper motives must also be recognised. It was his intention to establish unity in his government and administration, which was threatened by the excessive independence enjoyed by his governors (see for example, for matters relating to the nomination of judges, Khoury, Zur Ernennung von Richtern , 197 ff. but cf. the views here of B. Johansen, Wahrheit und Geltungsanspruch . Zur Begründung und Begrenzung der Autorität des Qadi-Urteils im islamischen Recht , in La Giustizia nell’alto medioevo ( secoli IX-XI ), ii, Spoleto 1997, 975-1065, esp. 981-2 n. 16). It was on the whole the same purpose as that pursued by ʿUmar, but by dint of his energy and prestige he had succeeded in conveying the weight of his authority even to the governors of other tribes and clans. ʿUt̲h̲mān believed he would be able to obtain the same results by using officials who were bound ¶ to him by blood ties, but he was not successful. The roles were reversed and it was the caliph who submitted to the influence of his relatives (perhaps, however, to a lesser extent than the official historiography implies). Furthermore, popular discontent recognised this as the sole cause of the calamities and assumed that they were probably not the result of the character of the official involved.

The system of the dīwān instituted by ʿUmar required that war booty be perpetually increased, since the regular tax returns on the ahl al-d̲h̲imma were not enough for the salaries of the new recruits who were flocking to the provinces from the heart of Arabia, and it is one of the great merits of Caetani to have drawn attention to this. This was also the motivation for the new expeditions which continuously extended the frontiers of the Arab empire during the caliphate of ʿUt̲h̲mān. One such expedition resulted in the conquest of the last provinces of the Sāsānid empire, whose dynasty came to an abrupt end with the murder of the last of their kings Yazdagird III. Another was the occupation of Armenia; and then again a series of incursions were made along the coast of North Africa into Nubia and into Asia Minor, and by sea into the Eastern Mediterranean. If the conquests accomplished or begun by the Arabs during the caliphate of ʿUt̲h̲mān were all to be examined, it would be clear that, though they may not have had the prodigious verve of those which took place under ʿUmar, nonetheless they marked in an imposing manner on the one hand the end of the initial period of the Arab empire, and on the other the prelude to the second period of expansion, that of the Umayyads.

The booty gleaned from these expeditions was, however, perhaps not as abundant as might have been hoped. Moreover, another of the grievances brought against ʿUt̲h̲mān arose from the fact that, instead of assigning such booty as there was to the fighters as a whole, he held back part of it for his governors and for members of his family, and thus developed the system of land grants ( ḳaṭāʾiʿ [see Ḍayʿa ; Ḳaṭīʿa ]) which had already generally been practised by ʿUmar. In this action is also possible to see a conscious attempt to create property for the state rather than simply being a means of enriching his relatives, which is a concept totally opposed to the populist procedure of a total division of the spoils of war among the combatants.

The Islamic empire tended from internal necessity to favour an ordered administration modelled on that of the Byzantines or the Persians. The one which ʿUmar had already drafted, the one which the Umayyads later realised in part and which the ʿAbbāsids achieved, was the transformation of the incoherent and anarchistic grouping of the tribes and of an absolute monarchy; this was also the programme embarked on by ʿUt̲h̲mān. He can be reproached for not having been able to choose the best methods of going about it, and can also be accused of not being up to the task, but his plan was adequate and merely followed the ideal set by ʿUmar. Moreover, the economic crisis that was the inevitable consequence of the sudden enrichment of the Arab masses made it essential for the state to economise and to cut back on the total number of military allowances [see ʿaṭāʾ ]; in turn these only served to increase the number of the discontented.

One of the measures which contributed most to the opposition of the religious lobby to ʿUt̲h̲mān, formed by the old Companions of the Prophet who were of simple or servile origins (ʿAmmār b. Yāsir, Abū D̲h̲arr, ʿAbd Allāh b. Masʿūd [q.vv.], etc.) and the influence ¶ of which the people strongly resented, was the official promulgation of the Ḳurʾān (see Nöldeke-Schwally, Geschichte des Qorans , ii, 42-119). What appeared to be the most offensive part of this procedure was the destruction of copies from the provinces. ʿUt̲h̲mān was probably compelled to do this out of consideration for religious order and liturgy, but perhaps the dominant motive was still political in nature. The ḳurrāʾ [q.v.] who were the custodians and also, of course, the readers and interpreters of the sacred text, by their very position held enormous power over the masses, and this in a sense placed them outside the scope of the central authorities. These in turn had no way of checking whether the Ḳurʾānic passages used by the ḳurrāʾ were authentic or not. By removing this weapon from them and by setting itself up as the sole custodian of revelation, the ruling power intended to bring about unity and to establish its absolute power over the state. It was, however, only a natural reaction for the opposition to this tendency to accuse the caliph of having mutilated and destroyed the divine word.

ʿUt̲h̲mān succeeded in making enemies for himself with many different groups; he became the scapegoat of the turbulent elements among the amṣār [see miṣr ] because of economic difficulties. They were inclined to accuse the caliph of confiscating the property of Muslims for his own benefit. A new pietism was emerging to which the affirmation of the authority of the state seemed against the egalitarian principles laid down by the Prophet. And finally, formerly deposed governors and leading Companions, like Ṭalḥa, al-Zubayr and ʿAlī, now out of power, were eager for it. It is questionable whether ʿUt̲h̲mān, while obviously following the course of conduct imposed on him by the needs of the state and by the example of his predecessor, would have been able to avoid the destiny which overtook him and which so deeply disrupted Islamic unity. Though any answer to this sort of question will always be uncertain, in the realms of history it is possible to surmise that a more intelligent mind and a more energetic temperament than his (or rather a real political genius such as Muʿāwiya, had he been head of state) would perhaps have overcome these difficulties. Perhaps his counsellor Marwān, too, who some thirty years later would show himself equal to a no less difficult situation, was lacking in experience or prudence. Certainly ʿUt̲h̲mān was incapable on his own, but he was also badly advised, and the very Umayyads whom he had showered with favours and riches preferred to think of themselves than of their relative in danger.

How the events took place can here be dealt with only summarily. Tradition mechanically divides the caliphate of ʿUt̲h̲mān into two periods of equal length, six years (23-29) of good government followed by six years (30-35) of lawlessness and disorder. The change is represented symbolically by the loss of the Prophet’s seal which according to legend, ʿUt̲h̲mān dropped into the well of Arīs in the year 30. Moreover, it was precisely at this period that the first rebellious movements began which were first seen in ʿIrāḳ, the region which suffered most from the economic crisis and where the dissident forces were most widespread. Abū D̲h̲arr, one of the precursors of asceticism in Islam, was exiled to Syria with some of his companions, and later sent down to al-Rabad̲h̲a [q.v.] to die there in destitution. Though the episode concerning him is embellished by legend, it is characteristic of the attitude of the emerging pietism with respect to the worldly transformation of the caliph.¶

Even more serious trouble erupted at Kūfa in the years 32-3/652-4, under the leadership of the ḳurrāʾ, whose religious nature merged with political activity and who collected about them doubtful elements. Despite a few severe measures adopted against them, the faction leaders succeeded in provoking the deposition of Saʿīd b. al-ʿĀṣ, who was replaced by the former governor of Baṣra, Abū Mūsā al-As̲h̲ʿarī, himself a pietist and an adversary of ʿUt̲h̲mān. From that time onwards Kūfa was beyond the reach of the central government.

Even in Egypt, Ibn Abī Sarḥ had to yield to the violence of a group led by the young Muḥammad b. Abī Ḥud̲h̲ayfa, who, although he was the adopted son of ʿUt̲h̲mān, nevertheless opposed him. It seems that the wily ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ, who had retreated to Palestine after being deposed, secretly supported the revolutionary movement in Egypt. The role of this movement must have been more important than was previously believed, since the payrus of Ibn Lahīʿa described the events from an Egyptian perspective and noted that the number of Egyptians involved in besieging the caliph was plainly greater than that of other parties (see Khoury, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Lahīʿa 181 ff., 190 ff.). The storm which was already looming broke at the end of 35/656 when the rebel troops advanced from the three provinces on Medina. The first to arrive were the Egyptian troops with ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUdays at their head, and they went on the Friday to worship in the mosque of the Prophet (ibid., 116, 282). Dramatic exchanges took place between the Egyptian troops and the caliph. The grievances against ʿUt̲h̲mān were set forth in extremely harsh language. But the rebels were disarmed by the humility and conciliatory attitude of the caliph, who consented to all their demands, promised to repeal all his previous measures and to change his governors. The Egyptians left satisfied, but on the way back, at the sand flats of al-ʿArīs̲h̲, a messenger from ʿUt̲h̲mān was stopped and a letter taken from him addressed by ʿUt̲h̲mān to Ibn Abī Sarḥ containing the order to put to death or to mutilate the leaders of the movement on their return.

The Egyptians were furious, retraced their steps and returned to Medina, determined on vengeance. It was at this point that the changes in fortune occurred, described by the papyrus roll of ʿAbd Allāh b. Lahīʿa, which indicates that Ibn ʿUdays was at the head of the Egyptians (the account of the second siege). ʿUt̲h̲mān denied that the letter was authentic and even insinuated that it had been forged by his enemies to ruin him. Although the official tradition has the tendency to ascribe this lie to Marwān, there is also evidence of other versions and even one (preserved only by al-Balād̲h̲urī) which claims that ʿUt̲h̲mān had suspected ʿAlī. In fact, this is what Caetani ( Annali , viii, 159), without any knowledge of this text, had already supposed. It is well known from other sources that it was a common practice to invent false documents designed to destroy an enemy who could not be defeated in any other way; but whatever one may think of this shady episode, it is certain that, whether or not it was the immediate cause of the tragic end of ʿUt̲h̲mān, other factors had already been set in motion. The events actually led, according to the papyrus, to a second siege of the house of ʿUt̲h̲mān, and the caliph began to speak in the presence of Abū T̲h̲awr al-Fahmī. The latter informed him of the return of the soldiers to destroy him, and then comes the oldest self-defence of the caliph that is known in its original version in Islam (see Khoury, ʿAbd Allāh ¶ Ibn Lahīʿa , 281, traditions 256 ff.). In this text, ʿUt̲h̲mān insists on the falsehood of the accusations levelled against him, highlights his role as the fourth person to adopt Islam, his oral collection of the Ḳurʾān from as far back as the lifetime of the Prophet, his marriage to two of the Prophet’s daughters (without naming them) as well as his exemplary spiritual life in the D̲h̲āhiliyya and in Islam (ibid., 282, traditions 260-4). Most hypocritical of all were the old Companions who opposed him in an underhanded manner. They did not dare to become accomplices in the violent deposition of the caliph, but neither did they wish to help him against the rebels; and so they, and in particular ʿAlī, maintained a malevolent neutrality. The Prophet’s widow ʿĀʾis̲h̲a [q.v.], who had led a violent campaign against ʿUt̲h̲mān, preferred to avoid the issue at the last moment on the pretext of a pilgrimage to Mecca.

In his extremity, ʿUt̲h̲mān knew how to retain all his dignity. He refused to abdicate, and after a siege, the length of which was variously estimated by different sources, some individuals were able to enter his house in the final days of 35 (June 656). They were led by Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr [q.v.], the son of the first caliph and the brother of ʿĀʾis̲h̲a, and it was he who seized ʿUt̲h̲mān. It is not clear whether he was the one who struck the final blow, or if it was someone else; tradition cites several names, and it is evident that right from the beginning the whole affair was obscure. It is said that the caliph’s blood flowed on to the copy of the Ḳurʾān which he was reading when he was attacked. His wife, the Kalbiyya Nāʾila bt. al-Furāfiṣa, was injured, and the house was ransacked. During the night his body was buried in deepest secrecy by his wife and a few close friends. The troops which Muʿāwiya had sent from Syria (tradition claims that they arrived too late and accuses them of duplicity) received the news of the murder when they were half-way there, and so they hastened to return. The same papyrus begins (see ibid., 244) with the pursuit of the Egyptian murderers, eventually imprisoned by Muʿāwiya in Lydda (Palestine), whose leader, Ibn ʿUdays, took flight but was recaptured by a horseman and was battered to death.

The election of the new caliph took place amid an atmosphere of tumult and terror, as is well known (see Caetani, Annali , ix, 321-42). According to this author, it demonstrates that no previous agreement existed between the leading Companions which could probably be thought to have anticipated these events. The election of ʿAlī was unquestionably due not so much to the prestige afforded him by his family connections and his alliance with the Prophet, but more to the support of the Anṣār who had regained influence in their city while the Umayyad party was in disarray. But right from its inception, the new régime was destined to be attacked either by other competitors disappointed in their expectations, or by Muʿāwiya, the only Umayyad governor who had remained in control of his province.

From then on, any political unity of Islam was over, and soon religious unity also, making way for a period of civil wars and schisms. The caliphate of ʿUt̲h̲mān and his bloody end marked a turning point in Islamic history and attributed an importance to the third caliph certainly not merited by what was in fact an altogether rather mediocre personality. History, and especially literary history, was captivated by his murder and wove various narratives around it, some of which were noteworthy and have been passed on under the heading of fitna (q.v., and ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Lahīʿa , ¶ 211-17; here there are different definitions of the term which the papyrus uses; see also Sellheim, 88-9).

Bibliography

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idem, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Lahīʿa, juge et grand maître de l’École égyptienne, Wiesbaden 1986 (see on ʿUt̲h̲mān in the papyrus, 181-99, Ar. text 244 ff.)

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Cite this page

Levi Della Vida, G. and Khoury, R.G., “ʿUt̲h̲mān b. ʿAffān”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 08 June 2023 <http://dx.doi.org.wikipedialibrary.idm.oclc.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_1315>

First published online: 2012

First print edition: ISBN: 9789004161214, 1960-2007